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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
In the absence of a forum-selection clause, a defendant 
in federal court may move under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for a 
transfer to another district for “convenience” and “in the 
interest of justice.”  But where contracting parties have 
specified the forum in which they will litigate disputes arising 
from their contract, federal courts must honor the  
forum-selection clause “[i]n all but the most unusual cases,” 
following the Supreme Court’s instructions in Atlantic 
Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court, 134 S. Ct. 
568, 583 (2013).  This mandamus proceeding requires us to 
determine how district courts should apply Atlantic Marine 
where all defendants seek a transfer to one district under 
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§ 1404(a) and where some, but not all, of those defendants are 
parties to forum-selection clauses that designate different 
districts.  Because we conclude the District Court erred in its 
application of Atlantic Marine by declining to honor the  
forum-selection clauses applicable to some of the litigants 
and by transferring the action in its entirety, we will issue a 
writ of mandamus and, applying the test we announce today, 
direct the District Court to transfer claims against only the 
two corporate defendants who did not agree to any forum-
selection clause. 
I. Background 
California natives Keegan Freeman, Michael Nordyke, 
Brett Sarkisian, Taylor Smith, and Bryan Wyatt (collectively, 
“Sales Representatives”) are former California sales 
representatives for Howmedica Osteonics Corp., a New 
Jersey corporation, and its parent company, Stryker Corp. 
(collectively, “Howmedica”).1  The Sales Representatives 
                                              
1 Any distinctions between the two companies are 
immaterial to this mandamus action, as “Howmedica 
Osteonics Corp.” was a party to all of the Sales 
Representatives’ employment agreements, whether by name 
in some agreements or as a subsidiary included within the 
definition of “Stryker,” where that entity was the party, in 
others.  And although the Sales Representatives previously 
contended that Howmedica Osteonics Corp. lacked standing 
to enforce Stryker’s contracts, they have not renewed—and 
hence have waived—that contention here.  See Gonzalez v. 
AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir. 2008); see also United 
States v. Menendez, 831 F.3d 155, 175 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(applying traditional appellate waiver rules in a mandamus 
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began their employment with Howmedica when they signed 
employment agreements with confidentiality and  
non-compete clauses.  The agreements also contained  
forum-selection clauses, which designated New Jersey (or, in 
Nordyke’s case, Michigan) as the forum for any litigation 
arising out of the agreements. 
After clashes with Howmedica over its management 
and their compensation, the Sales Representatives resigned 
and became independent contractors representing 
Howmedica’s competitor, DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., and 
DePuy’s regional distributor, Golden State Orthopaedics, Inc.  
Some of Howmedica’s customers, who were previously 
assigned to the Sales Representatives, followed them, leading 
Howmedica to suspect that the Sales Representatives, DePuy, 
and Golden State had conspired to convert those customers 
even in advance of the Sales Representatives’ resignation 
dates.  Howmedica therefore brought suit in the District of 
New Jersey, charging DePuy and the Sales Representatives 
with breach of contract and related claims under state law, 
and joining Golden State to the suit as a “necessary party.” 
Emphasizing the convenience to themselves and to the 
witnesses in California, the defendants promptly moved to 
transfer the case to the Northern District of California 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which, for “the convenience 
of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice,” 
allows transfer to a district where the case “might have been 
brought.”  See Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Sarkisian 
                                                                                                     
proceeding), cert. denied sub nom. Menendez v. United 
States, 137 S. Ct. 1332 (2017). 
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(Howmedica I), No. 14-3449, 2015 WL 1780941, at *2 
(D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2015).  After balancing the relevant public 
and private interests, the District Court agreed and ordered 
the transfer.  See Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Sarkisian 
(Howmedica II), No. 14-3449, 2016 WL 8677214, at *2-6 
(D.N.J. Aug. 26, 2016).2  The District Court did not address 
Golden State’s separate argument asserting that the District of 
New Jersey lacked personal jurisdiction as to that defendant.  
See Howmedica II, 2016 WL 8677214, at *2-6.3 
                                              
2 In so doing, the District Court affirmed the order of 
the Magistrate Judge, who had granted the transfer motions 
pursuant to his authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), and who had held, in the 
alternative, that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over Golden State.  See Howmedica I, 2015 WL 1780941, at 
*1 n.2, *7-9 & n.11.  The Magistrate Judge declined to 
address Golden State’s and the Sales Representatives’ 
alternative contention that, because venue in New Jersey was 
improper under the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391, 
transfer was required under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, which 
authorizes transfer for the purpose of curing venue defects.  
See Howmedica I, 2015 WL 1780941, at *2.  No defendant 
has renewed these venue objections before this Court, and 
they are therefore waived.  See Gonzalez, 549 F.3d at 225. 
3 Golden State preserved its personal jurisdiction 
challenge by raising it before both the District Court and this 
Court.  The other defendants, however, did not.  Although the 
Sales Representatives also asserted to the Magistrate Judge 
and to the District Court that New Jersey lacked personal 
jurisdiction over them, personal jurisdiction is “a waivable 
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While those New Jersey proceedings were pending, 
Golden State filed its own suit for declaratory relief against 
Howmedica in the Northern District of California, alleging 
that the non-compete clauses in Howmedica’s employment 
agreements violated California law.  That district court issued 
an order deeming Golden State’s suit related to the transferred 
New Jersey case and also issued two preliminary scheduling 
orders in the transferred case, but it then stayed both cases 
after Howmedica petitioned this Court for a writ of 
mandamus.  Howmedica now asks us to vacate the District 
Court’s transfer order on the ground that it contravenes the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine Construction 
Co. v. U.S. District Court, which held that, except in “the 
most unusual cases,” a district court should give effect to a 
valid forum-selection clause.  134 S. Ct. 568, 583 (2013).4 
                                                                                                     
right,” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
n.14 (1985); see, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1), and the Sales 
Representatives waived any personal jurisdiction challenge 
by failing to raise it here, see Gonzalez, 549 F.3d at 225.  
Moreover, all of the Sales Representatives but one consented 
to jurisdiction in New Jersey within their employment 
agreements.  See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 n.14.  For its 
part, DePuy has never raised a personal jurisdiction objection. 
4 In Atlantic Marine, the Supreme Court 
“presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”  
134 S. Ct. at 581 n.5.  We will do the same, because no 
defendant has challenged the validity of the forum-selection 
clauses in the Sales Representatives’ employment 
agreements, thus waiving any such challenge, see Gonzalez, 
549 F.3d at 225, and because, regardless of the treatment of 
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Below, we first confirm our jurisdiction to entertain 
Howmedica’s mandamus petition.  Second, we consider the 
applicable standard of review.  Third, we address the crux of 
this case: how district courts should apply Atlantic Marine 
when all defendants seek a transfer to one district under 
§ 1404(a), but only some of those defendants agreed to 
forum-selection clauses that designate a different district. 
II. Discussion 
A. Jurisdiction5 
The defendants have challenged our jurisdiction, 
contending that review of a § 1404(a) transfer order is 
permissible only to remedy a procedural defect and that, 
regardless, the Northern District of California’s post-transfer 
orders in this case preclude our review.  We, however, 
perceive no jurisdictional defect.   
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, grants us 
jurisdiction to adjudicate a mandamus petition challenging an 
interlocutory order over which, pursuant to another 
jurisdictional statute, we could exercise jurisdiction at a later 
point.  See United States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 134, 145 (3d 
                                                                                                     
the agreements’ non-compete clauses under California law, 
see generally Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 
285, 290-91 (Cal. 2008), the non-compete clauses are 
severable from the agreements’ forum-selection clauses. 
5 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
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Cir. 2015); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 
284, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, because 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
affords us jurisdiction to review district courts’ § 1404(a) 
transfer orders after entry of final judgment, those transfer 
orders are reviewable on a mandamus petition.  See In re 
United States, 273 F.3d 380, 382-85 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 772-74 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Moreover, under our case law, our mandamus 
jurisdiction over transfer orders encompasses both procedural 
and legal issues.  See In re United States, 273 F.3d at 384 
(procedural issues); id. at 389-90 (legal issue).  The District 
Court’s § 1404 transfer order therefore falls within a class of 
orders reviewable on mandamus. 
But that does not end our jurisdictional inquiry, for we 
do not “indefinitely” possess mandamus jurisdiction, and, 
“once the transferee court proceeds with the transferred case, 
the decision as to the propriety of transfer is to be made in the 
transferee court,” whether by appeal or by mandamus petition 
to the court of appeals for the transferee circuit.  Id. at 384.  
The question, then, is at what point the transferee court 
“proceeds” with a transferred case, and whether the transferee 
court in this case, by issuing two scheduling orders and an 
order deeming the case related to Golden State’s previously 
filed case, has crossed that threshold. 
We conclude this case has not proceeded in the 
Northern District of California in a manner that would 
deprive us of jurisdiction.  In In re United States, even after 
the transferee court had received the record from the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and had “scheduled the case for 
prompt trial,” we held that we retained mandamus jurisdiction 
over the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s transfer order.  Id. 
at 382-84.  And although we declined to indicate “the specific 
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length of time needed to allow the party resisting transfer to 
seek review” before our Court, we held that the Government, 
contesting the transfer order by mandamus petition, had 
“acted with sufficient dispatch”—even though the 
Government had filed its mandamus petition thirty-three days 
after the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had denied the 
Government’s request for reconsideration of the transfer order 
and twelve days after the transferee court had issued a trial 
scheduling order.  See id. at 382, 384; Order, United States v. 
Streeval, No. 01-0084-1 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2001), ECF 
No. 12. 
We reach the same conclusion here.  Howmedica filed 
its mandamus petition only twenty-seven days after the 
District Court’s transfer order, as compared to the thirty-three 
day delay in In re United States.  And although the transferee 
court in the Northern District of California issued two case 
management scheduling orders and an order relating the 
transferred case to Golden State’s previously filed case, those 
orders do not show that the transferee court here proceeded 
any further with the case than the transferee court did in In re 
United States by issuing a trial scheduling order.  Because we 
have held that case management orders in the transferee court 
are not sufficient to divest us of jurisdiction, we conclude that 
the Northern District of California did not proceed with this 
case and that Howmedica acted with “sufficient dispatch” in 
filing its mandamus petition, which we have jurisdiction to 
consider.  In re United States, 273 F.3d at 382-84.6 
                                              
6 In In re United States, we did not identify at what 
point the transferee court definitively “proceeds” with the 
case so as to divest us of mandamus jurisdiction, 273 F.3d at 
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B. Standard of Review 
A writ of mandamus is, of course, an “extraordinary” 
remedy.  United States v. Wright, 776 F.3d 134, 145-46 (3d 
Cir. 2015).  It may issue only if the petitioner shows (1) a 
clear and indisputable “abuse of discretion or . . . error of 
law,” (2) “a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate relief,” 
and (3) “a likelihood of irreparable injury.”  Id.; see also 
                                                                                                     
384, whether it occurs at the moment the transferee court 
issues a discovery ruling, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), (c); 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, at the moment it issues a legally binding 
ruling that would become the law of the case, see Musacchio 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 716 (2016); Hayman Cash 
Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1982), 
or at the moment some other threshold is crossed.  We 
likewise do not resolve that question today, given that our 
ruling in In re United States controls the jurisdictional 
analysis here. 
DePuy’s counsel raised the concern at argument that, if 
the transferor Circuit can retain jurisdiction notwithstanding a 
transfer order, then the resulting jurisdictional regime will 
prompt extensive discovery requests in future cases, reaching 
even merits discovery under the guise of determining 
§ 1404(a) transfer motions.  We believe that concern is 
unfounded, for our longstanding precedent provides that 
discovery on the merits “is irrelevant to the determination of 
the preliminary question of transfer.”  McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Polin, 429 F.2d 30, 30-31 (3d Cir. 1970) (per 
curiam); accord Wood v. Zapata Corp., 482 F.2d 350, 357 
(3d Cir. 1973). 
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Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004); Sunbelt 
Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Even when these requirements are met, we may, in 
the exercise of our discretion, decline to issue a writ of 
mandamus when it is not “appropriate under the 
circumstances.”  Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. 
Appropriate circumstances are more readily present 
where, as here, a petitioner challenges a transfer order.  
Transfer orders as a class meet the second requirement for a 
writ of mandamus, “a lack of an alternate avenue for adequate 
relief,” Wright, 776 F.3d at 146, because “the possibility of an 
appeal in the transferee forum following a final judgment 
there is not an adequate alternative to obtain the relief 
sought,” Sunbelt Corp., 5 F.3d at 30.  Transfer orders likewise 
meet the third requirement, “a likelihood of irreparable 
injury,” Wright, 776 F.3d at 146, because an erroneous 
transfer may result in “judicially sanctioned irreparable 
procedural injury,” Chi., R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 
378, 381 (7th Cir. 1954); accord In re United States, 273 F.3d 
at 385.  Thus, our inquiry here collapses to the first 
requirement: Was the District Court’s transfer order a clear 
and indisputable “abuse of discretion or . . . error of law” for 
which mandamus relief is appropriate?  Wright, 776 F.3d at 
146; see In re United States, 273 F.3d at  
385-90; Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 919 F.2d 225, 
230-33 (3d Cir. 1990).  We will apply this standard of review, 
turning now to the merits of the parties’ dispute. 
C. Application of Atlantic Marine 
The Supreme Court made clear in Atlantic Marine that, 
in most cases, district courts must enforce valid forum-
selection clauses when adjudicating § 1404(a) transfer 
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motions, but the Court did not have occasion to address how 
that general rule should apply where non-contracting parties 
are present, much less how it should apply where, as here, 
there are other complications such as competing forum-
selection clauses, personal jurisdiction challenges, and 
allegations of necessary party status.  That is the quandary we 
confront today, and we resolve it by (1) reviewing the legal 
principles relevant both in the absence of a forum-selection 
clause and where one is present; (2) developing from those 
principles a framework for applying Atlantic Marine to cases 
involving both contracting and non-contracting parties; and 
(3) applying that framework to the facts of this case. 
1. Governing Legal Principles 
To understand Atlantic Marine’s significance and its 
instructions regarding § 1404(a) transfers when a  
forum-selection clause is present, we begin with a review of 
the legal principles governing the § 1404(a) transfer analysis 
in the absence of a forum-selection clause.  In such cases, 
courts decide whether to grant a § 1404(a) transfer by 
evaluating various private and public interests.  See Atl. 
Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 & n.6; Jumara v. State Farm Ins. 
Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995).  The balancing of those 
interests is in the district courts’ discretion, see Shutte v. 
Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970), but we 
have prescribed an “enumeration of factors to be balanced” in 
each case, Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80. 
Private interests to be balanced relate to “the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses.”  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404(a).  They therefore include the “plaintiff’s forum 
preference as manifested in the original choice”; “the 
defendant’s preference”; “whether the claim arose 
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elsewhere”; “the convenience of the parties as indicated by 
their relative physical and financial condition”; “the 
convenience of the witnesses”; and “the location of books and 
records,” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, as well as “all other 
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious 
and inexpensive,” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 & n.6. 
By contrast, public interests to be balanced are not 
necessarily tied to the parties, but instead derive from “the 
interest of justice.”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  These interests 
include “the enforceability of the judgment”; “the relative 
administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court 
congestion”; “the local interest in deciding local controversies 
at home”; “the public policies of the fora”; and “the 
familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in 
diversity cases.”  Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.  We regard 
these public interests to include judicial economy 
considerations, which support “having the two actions in the 
same district (through transfer)” when the two cases are in 
different courts but involve “the same or similar issues and 
parties.”7  1 James Moore et al., Moore’s Manual: Federal 
                                              
7 To the extent we recognized the “practical 
considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or 
inexpensive” as a public interest in Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, 
we did so with judicial economy considerations in mind, as 
those particular practical considerations constitute a public 
interest, while practical considerations that might burden the 
parties constitute a private interest.  Today, we clarify that 
“practical problems that make trial of a case easy, 
expeditious, and inexpensive” represent a private interest, as 
the Supreme Court stated in Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 
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Practice and Procedure, § 7.81[3][c] (2017).  In other 
instances, judicial economy considerations weigh against 
transfer when a separate case involving “the same or similar 
legal and factual issues” is pending in the originating district.  
Id. 
The weighing of private and public interests under 
§ 1404(a) changes, however, if a forum-selection clause 
enters the picture.  When that happens, as the Supreme Court 
clarified in Atlantic Marine, “district courts [must] adjust 
their usual § 1404(a) analysis in three ways.”  134 S. Ct. at 
581.  Specifically, district courts (1) must give no weight to 
the forum preferred by “the party defying the forum-selection 
clause”; (2) must deem the private interests to “weigh entirely 
in favor of the preselected forum” because the parties agreed 
to the preselected forum and thereby waived the right to 
challenge it as inconvenient; and (3) must proceed to analyze 
only public interests.  Id. at 581-82.  The Supreme Court 
explained that, with these modifications to the typical 
§ 1404(a) analysis, district courts should enforce valid  
forum-selection clauses “[i]n all but the most unusual cases.”  
Id. at 583. 
While the Court in Atlantic Marine modified the 
§ 1404(a) transfer inquiry for contracting parties who 
                                                                                                     
581 n.6, and as we have often stated in the forum non 
conveniens context, see, e.g., Kisano Trade & Invest Ltd. v. 
Lemster, 737 F.3d 869, 873 (3d Cir. 2013); Eurofins Pharma 
US Holdings v. BioAlliance Pharma SA, 623 F.3d 147, 161 
(3d Cir. 2010), and we acknowledge judicial economy 
considerations to be a distinct, cognizable public interest.  
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affirmatively agreed to litigate in a particular forum as an 
express term of their agreements, see id. at 581-82, it did not 
disturb in any way the customary § 1404(a) analysis that 
applies where parties are not bound by a forum-selection 
clause, see id. at 581-84.  Those modifications, in other 
words, are inapplicable where a case involves only  
non-contracting parties.  And for good reason.  Where 
Atlantic Marine establishes what amounts to a strong 
presumption in favor of enforcing forum-selection clauses, 
see id. at 581, 583, the private and public interests that inform 
a § 1404(a) transfer inquiry do not bespeak a presumption one 
way or another and require a district court to conduct a wide-
ranging inquiry specific to the circumstances of that case, see 
Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.  Similarly, where the Atlantic 
Marine framework would wholly deprive non-contracting 
parties of their right to seek transfer on the basis of their 
private interests, the customary § 1404(a) analysis guarantees 
them that right.  See id.   
For these reasons, we have need of a separate 
framework to determine how forum-selection clauses affect 
the § 1404(a) transfer analysis where both contracting and 
non-contracting parties are found in the same case and where 
the non-contracting parties’ private interests run headlong 
into the presumption of Atlantic Marine—hence, the problem 
we confront today. 
2. Four-Step Framework 
Fortunately, in taking on this challenge, we do not 
write on a blank slate.  Our colleagues in the Fifth Circuit 
have forged an approach that we consider a helpful starting 
point for our own.   
17 
 
In In re Rolls Royce Corp., where a helicopter owner 
brought suit against various entities involved in its aircraft’s 
design and manufacture, and where the forum-selection 
clause applied to only one of the defending parties (Rolls 
Royce), the Fifth Circuit prescribed a three-step framework.  
775 F.3d 671, 674, 681 (5th Cir. 2014).  First, the Fifth 
Circuit confirmed that, owing to the Supreme Court’s 
guidance in Atlantic Marine, contracting parties’ private 
interests support transferring any claims involving those 
parties to their agreed-upon forum, a result which may be 
accomplished after first severing those claims pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.  Id. at 681.  Second, the 
court recognized that, just as non-contracting parties’ private 
interests are routinely considered in a traditional § 1404(a) 
analysis, those interests must still be considered even when a 
forum-selection clause is present in the case.  Id.  Lastly, the 
Fifth Circuit directed district courts to “ask whether this 
preliminary weighing is outweighed by the judicial economy 
considerations of having all claims determined in a single 
lawsuit,” taking into account “procedural mechanisms . . . , 
such as common pre-trial procedures, video depositions, 
stipulations, etc.” that could alleviate any inefficiencies 
resulting from severance.  Id.  Applying this framework, the 
court concluded that it would enforce the forum-selection 
clause in that case by severing and transferring claims against 
Rolls Royce, but also observed that non-contracting parties’ 
interests and considerations of judicial economy at times “can 
trump a forum-selection clause.”  Id. at 679-83. 
We embrace much of our Sister Circuit’s approach, 
but, prompted by the challenges raised in this case—for 
example, the contention that a forum specified in some of the 
parties’ contracts lacks personal jurisdiction over Golden 
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State and the assertion that Golden State is a “necessary 
party”—we deem some modifications warranted.  Building 
on Rolls Royce, we prescribe a four-step inquiry in which the 
reviewing court, whether the District Court in the first 
instance, or this Court on appeal, will consider in sequence: 
(1) the forum-selection clauses, (2) the private and public 
interests relevant to non-contracting parties, (3) threshold 
issues related to severance, and (4) which transfer decision 
most promotes efficiency while minimizing prejudice to non-
contracting parties’ private interests. 
Step One: Forum-Selection Clauses.  At the first step, 
the court assumes that Atlantic Marine applies to parties who 
agreed to forum-selection clauses and that, “[i]n all but the 
most unusual cases,” claims concerning those parties should 
be litigated in the fora designated by the clauses.  Atl. Marine, 
134 S. Ct. at 583.  This step mirrors the first step of the Fifth 
Circuit’s framework, which provides that “the private factors 
of the parties who have signed a forum agreement . . . cut in 
favor of severance and transfer to the contracted[-]for forum.”  
Rolls Royce, 775 F.3d at 681. 
Step Two: Private and Public Interests Relevant to 
Non-Contracting Parties.  Second, the court performs an 
independent analysis of private and public interests relevant 
to non-contracting parties, just as when adjudicating a 
§ 1404(a) transfer motion involving those parties in the 
absence of any forum-selection clauses.8  See Jumara, 55 
                                              
8 At this step, assuming that the court intends to handle 
the § 1404(a) transfer issues first, the court should suspend 
concerns about other threshold issues such as subject-matter 
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, improper venue, or 
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F.3d at 879-80.  This step, like the first, tracks the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach: courts at Step Two should consider the 
private and public interests “of the parties who have not 
signed a forum-selection agreement.”  Rolls Royce, 775 F.3d 
at 681.  If, at this juncture, the Step One and Step Two 
analyses point to the same forum, then the court should allow 
the case to proceed in that forum, whether by transfer or by 
retaining jurisdiction over the entire case, and the transfer 
inquiry ends there. 
Step Three: Threshold Issues Related to Severance.  
Third, if the Step One and Step Two analyses point different 
ways, then the court considers severance.  See Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 21.  In some cases, severance clearly will be warranted to 
preserve federal diversity jurisdiction; to cure personal 
jurisdiction, venue, or joinder defects; or to allow for 
subsequent impleader under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
14.9  In such cases, the court should sever and transfer claims 
                                                                                                     
misjoinder, as it has discretion to address convenience-based 
venue issues first under Sinochem International Co. v. 
Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425, 
432 (2007).  Under our four-step framework, any other 
threshold issues are reserved for Steps Three and Four of the 
transfer inquiry. 
9 See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 
U.S. 567, 572-73 (2004) (diversity jurisdiction); DirecTV, 
Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844-45 (3d Cir. 2006) (joinder); 
Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp., 90 F.3d 
1523, 1544-45 (10th Cir. 1996) (personal jurisdiction); 
Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 296 
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as appropriate to remedy jurisdictional and procedural 
defects.  If only one severance and transfer outcome satisfies 
the constraints identified at this step, then the court adopts 
that outcome and the transfer inquiry ends.  But if more than 
one outcome satisfies the threshold severance constraints, 
then the court continues to Step Four. 
In other cases, severance is clearly disallowed, such as 
when a party is indispensable under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 19(b).  See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., 
L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 572-73 (2004); Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. 
Co. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 421-22 (3d Cir. 2010).  In these 
cases, the court cannot sever, see Publicker Indus., Inc. v. 
Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir. 1979), 
and the case must continue with all parties present in a forum 
where jurisdiction and venue are proper as to the 
indispensable party, which could be either the originating 
district court or the court to which transfer is sought.  If 
jurisdiction and venue are proper as to the indispensable party 
in only one of those courts, then the transfer inquiry ends 
there and the case must continue in that court.  If, however, 
jurisdiction and venue are proper as to the indispensable party 
in both the originating court and the proposed transferee 
court, then, in deciding where the whole case should proceed, 
the court proceeds to Step Four. 
Likewise, in cases where severance is neither clearly 
warranted nor clearly disallowed and is therefore committed 
to the court’s discretion (such as when there are no 
                                                                                                     
(3d Cir. 1994) (venue); Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52, 
55 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1970) (impleader). 
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indispensable parties or defects in jurisdiction, venue, or 
joinder), the court goes on to select the appropriate fora based 
on a combination of interests addressed at the next step. 
Step Four: Efficiency and Non-Contracting Parties’ 
Private Interests.  Fourth, and akin to the final step in the 
Fifth Circuit’s framework, see Rolls Royce, 775 F.3d at 681, a 
district court exercises its discretion (which we will review 
for abuse of discretion) in choosing the most appropriate 
course of action, see DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 844; Shutte, 431 
F.2d at 25, but it measures its decision against two key sets of 
interests.  On the one hand, the court considers efficiency 
interests in avoiding duplicative litigation, see D’Jamoos v. 
Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 111 (3d Cir. 2009), taking 
into account case management techniques that can reduce 
inefficiencies accompanying severance, Rolls Royce, 775 
F.3d at 681, as well as any other public interests that may 
weigh against enforcing a forum-selection clause, see Atl. 
Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582; Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.  On the 
other hand, the court also considers the non-contracting 
parties’ private interests and any prejudice that a particular 
transfer decision would cause with respect to those interests.  
See Rolls Royce, 775 F.3d at 681; DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 846-
47; Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. 
In exercising its discretion to determine whether it 
should retain the case in its entirety, transfer the case in its 
entirety, or sever certain parties or claims in favor of another 
forum, the court considers the nature of any interests 
weighing against enforcement of any forum-selection clause; 
the relative number of non-contracting parties to contracting 
parties; and the non-contacting parties’ relative resources, 
keeping in mind any jurisdiction, venue, or joinder defects 
that the court must resolve.  Only if it determines that the 
22 
 
strong public interest in upholding the contracting parties’ 
settled expectations is “overwhelmingly” outweighed by the 
countervailing interests can the court, at this fourth step, 
decline to enforce a valid forum-selection clause.  
Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581, 583. 
3. Analysis 
Applying this framework to the record of this case, we 
hold that a writ of mandamus is warranted.  Although we 
acknowledge the novelty and difficulty of the task set before 
the District Court, we conclude that court’s transfer decision 
and its reasoning for the decision misapplied Atlantic Marine 
in ways that constitute clear and indisputable errors.  Below, 
we address those errors and then analyze the appropriate fora 
using the four-step framework we announce today. 
a. The District Court’s Errors 
The District Court misapplied Atlantic Marine in two 
ways.  First, although the District Court acknowledged 
Atlantic Marine’s applicability to the contracting parties in 
this case (Howmedica and the Sales Representatives), it did 
not apply Atlantic Marine’s precepts correctly to those 
parties.  Specifically, the District Court bypassed the initial 
step where a district court “must deem the [contracting 
parties’] private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of 
the preselected forum.”  Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582; see 
Howmedica II, 2016 WL 8677214, at *3-4.  And, even when 
it professed to address only “public-interest considerations,” 
the District Court conflated public interests with private ones 
by considering the parties’ and witnesses’ convenience, 
which are not public interests, but private ones.  See 
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Howmedica II, 2016 WL 8677214, at *3; cf. Atl. Marine, 134 
S. Ct. at 581 n.6; Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.10 
Second, the District Court did not acknowledge or 
address the fact that Atlantic Marine applies only to parties 
who agreed to a forum-selection clause—not, as the District 
Court’s opinion implies, either to the whole case or not at all.  
See Howmedica II, 2016 WL 8677214, at *3-6.  The District 
Court’s “all or nothing” approach contravenes Atlantic 
Marine’s language, which specifies that a forum-selection 
clause “represents the parties’ agreement as to the most 
proper forum” and was “bargained for by the parties.”  Atl. 
Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.  In light of how the Supreme Court 
limited Atlantic Marine’s holding to contracting parties, the 
District Court erred in creating a false dichotomy between, on 
the one hand, applying Atlantic Marine to all parties in the 
                                              
10 For example, the District Court purported to 
consider the enforceability of the judgment as a  
public-interest factor and concluded that that factor favored 
transfer notwithstanding any forum-selection clauses, 
reasoning that “it will be easier to obtain judgment over [the 
defendants] in California because [the majority of the 
defendants] reside in that state.”  Howmedica II, 2016 WL 
8677214, at *3 (brackets omitted).  But the public interest in 
the enforceability of the judgment is not concerned with the 
convenience with which the parties may obtain a judgment; 
rather, this factor concerns whether a judgment is capable of 
being enforced at all.  See generally, e.g., Bhatnagar v. 
Surrendra Overseas Ltd., 52 F.3d 1220, 1225 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1995). 
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case and, on the other hand, applying it to none.  See 
Howmedica II, 2016 WL 8677214, at *3-6. 
Given the District Court’s clear and indisputable 
errors, mandamus is warranted, so we turn next to the scope 
of that mandamus.  While we could remand and direct the 
District Court to apply the four-step framework we prescribe 
today, we have discretion to apply it ourselves where no 
additional record development is needed, the outcome is clear 
as a matter of law, and our application best serves the 
interests of judicial efficiency.  See Wallach v. Eaton Corp., 
837 F.3d 356, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2016).  Those criteria are met 
here, so we proceed to address the question of where the 
claims in this case should proceed.  We conclude that the 
proper disposition of the defendants’ § 1404(a) transfer 
motions is severance of Howmedica’s claims against DePuy 
and Golden State, transfer of the severed claims to the 
Northern District of California pursuant to § 1404(a), and 
denial of the motion to transfer the claims against the Sales 
Representatives.  We reach this conclusion applying today’s 
four-step framework. 
b. The Proper Fora Under the Applied 
Framework 
i. Step One: Forum-Selection Clauses 
At Step One, we presume that valid forum-selection 
clauses should be enforced against the relevant contracting 
parties.  Given the number of defendants and their different 
positions in this case, at Step One we address them in two 
groups. 
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Freeman, Sarkisian, Smith, and Wyatt.  These Sales 
Representatives agreed to New Jersey forum-selection 
clauses, and Howmedica seeks to enforce those clauses, so we 
presume that Howmedica’s claims against these Sales 
Representatives should be litigated in the District of New 
Jersey. 
DePuy, Golden State, and Nordyke.  None of the other 
defendants agreed to New Jersey forum-selection clauses, 
though Nordyke’s employment agreement had a Michigan 
forum-selection clause.  Because neither Nordyke nor 
Howmedica now seeks to enforce the Michigan  
forum-selection clause, and because venue objections are 
waivable, even when premised on a forum-selection clause, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b); Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & 
Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 
740, 746 (7th Cir. 2007), we do not consider Michigan as a 
possible venue for Howmedica’s claims against Nordyke.  
Accordingly, DePuy, Golden State, and Nordyke all are not 
subject to the presumption that the claims against them should 
be litigated in a contractually agreed-upon forum.  Cf. 
Atlantic Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581, 583. 
Instead, we consider Howmedica’s argument that these 
three defendants are bound by the other Sales 
Representatives’ New Jersey forum-selection clauses under 
the “closely related parties” doctrine and that, therefore, we 
must apply Atlantic Marine’s presumption in favor of a New 
Jersey forum.  See generally Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della 
Citta del Vaticano, 714 F.3d 714, 722 & n.8 (2d Cir. 2013).11  
                                              
11 In this case, we analyze the “closely related parties” 
doctrine as a matter of federal common law, because “federal 
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We have held, however, that a forum-selection clause “can be 
enforced only by the signator[y] to [the] agreement[],” 
Dayhoff, Inc. v. H.J.Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1293-97 (3d 
Cir. 1996), which DePuy, Golden State,12 and Nordyke were 
not.  There is thus no presumption that Howmedica’s claims 
against these three defendants should be litigated in New 
                                                                                                     
law, specifically 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)” and federal common 
law interpreting that statute, “governs the District Court’s 
decision whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection 
clause and transfer the case.”  Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh 
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 32 (1988). 
12 Although the Northern District of California held, in 
the context of Golden State’s suit for a declaratory judgment 
against Howmedica, that Golden State was closely related to 
Howmedica’s employment agreements with the Sales 
Representatives, that court’s conclusion is not binding here 
for two reasons.  First, issue preclusion is inapplicable 
because the Northern District of California stayed Golden 
State’s suit pending our disposition of this one, so the court’s 
holding was not essential to any judgment.  See B & B 
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1303 
(2015); Golden State Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Howmedica 
Osteonics Corp., No. 14-3073, 2016 WL 4698931, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2016).  Second, the Northern District of 
California based its holding on Ninth Circuit case law we 
explicitly rejected in Dayhoff.  See Dayhoff, 86 F.3d at 1296; 
cf. Golden State Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Howmedica Osteonics 
Corp., No. 14-3073, 2014 WL 12691050, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. 
Oct. 31, 2014). 
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Jersey, and we will proceed to address Howmedica’s claims 
against them at Step Two of the transfer inquiry.13 
ii. Step Two: Private and Public Interests 
Relevant to Non-Contracting Parties 
We perform at Step Two an independent § 1404(a) 
analysis of private and public interests relevant to DePuy, 
                                              
13 While some courts have held that a non-signatory 
may enforce or be bound by a forum-selection clause, even 
those courts do not apply the “closely related parties” doctrine 
if doing so would have been unforeseeable for the party 
against whom the clause would be enforced.  See, e.g., Magi 
XXI, 714 F.3d at 717-20, 722-24; Lipcon v. Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998); Hugel 
v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993).  
Hence, Howmedica’s “closely related parties” argument 
would not prevail even under those courts’ case law, for 
DePuy, Golden State, and Nordyke could not have foreseen 
that the other Sales Representatives’ forum-selection clauses 
could later be enforced against them.  That is because there is 
no evidence that DePuy or Golden State were aware of or 
participated in the other Sales Representatives’ contractual 
negotiations with Howmedica, Nordyke’s employment 
agreement with Howmedica had its own (different)  
forum-selection clause, and, even if Nordyke could have 
known about the forum-selection clauses in the other Sales 
Representatives’ employment agreements, that knowledge 
would have rendered a New Jersey forum foreseeable only for 
a dispute over another Sales Representative’s conduct, not for 
a dispute over Nordyke’s own conduct. 
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Golden State, and Nordyke.  Here, to the extent the District 
Court discussed interests relevant to those three defendants, 
we agree with the District Court’s analysis of private and 
public interests.  See Howmedica II, 2016 WL 8677214, at 
*3-6.  After all, the claims against these defendants arise from 
their alleged actions in California; it is far easier for Nordyke, 
who has fewer financial resources than Howmedica, to 
litigate in California; surgeons and former Howmedica 
employees who may serve as witnesses are located in 
California; and trial would therefore be easier and less 
expensive in California.  See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80. 
Because our Step Two analysis weighs in favor of 
transferring Howmedica’s claims against DePuy, Golden 
State, and Nordyke to the Northern District of California, and 
because that result is in conflict with the Step One 
presumption that Howmedica’s claims against the remaining 
defendants should proceed in New Jersey, we next assess 
whether severance is warranted. 
iii. Step Three: Threshold Issues Related to 
Severance 
At Step Three, we consider threshold issues such as 
the presence of indispensable parties and defects in subject-
matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, or joinder, all 
of which may direct our severance analysis.  Here, we must 
consider two such issues. 
First, although Howmedica justified its decision to join 
Golden State as a defendant by asserting Golden State is a 
“necessary party,” Golden State, in fact, does not meet the 
relevant criteria under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b).  
To be an indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure Rule 19(b), a party must also be a “required” party 
under Rule 19(a).  That the parties are allegedly joint 
tortfeasors or that the judgment might set “a persuasive 
precedent” against the alleged required party is not sufficient.  
Huber v. Taylor, 532 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2008); see 
Temple v. Synthes. Corp., 498 U.S. 5, 7 (1990); Lomando v. 
United States, 667 F.3d 363, 384 (3d Cir. 2011).  Yet that is 
all we have here: Golden State is no more than an alleged 
joint tortfeasor, and any judgment without Golden State’s 
presence in this case would relate only to the other 
defendants, would not have preclusive effect against Golden 
State, see B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 1293, 1303 (2015), and at most would be “persuasive 
precedent,” Huber, 532 F.3d at 250.  Golden State, then, is 
neither a “required” party under Rule 19(a) nor an 
indispensable party under Rule 19(b), and it is permissible to 
sever claims against this defendant.  See Grupo Dataflux, 541 
U.S. at 572-73. 
Second, New Jersey’s lack of personal jurisdiction 
over Golden State, which Howmedica has never challenged 
except by means of its unsuccessful “closely related parties” 
argument, requires dismissal or transfer of at least the claims 
against Golden State.  See Howmedica I, 2015 WL 1780941, 
at *7-8 & n.11.  Nothing in the record indicates that Golden 
State deliberately engaged in “significant activities” within 
New Jersey or created “continuing obligations” between itself 
and New Jersey residents, and the absence of those 
prerequisites means that Golden State lacks the 
constitutionally required “minimum contacts” sufficient to 
allow New Jersey to exercise personal jurisdiction.  Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1985).  
Accordingly, the District of New Jersey cannot retain 
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jurisdiction over Howmedica’s claims against Golden State, 
see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k), and at least those claims should be 
transferred to the Northern District of California, where 
personal jurisdiction over Golden State is proper. 
The Step Three analysis, in sum, indicates that 
Howmedica’s claims against Golden State may be severed 
and, indeed, that dismissal or transfer of those claims to 
another forum is mandatory. 
iv. Step Four: Efficiency and  
Non-Contracting Parties’ Private 
Interests 
To recap, the first three steps of our analysis present us 
with three options: severance and transfer of only the claims 
against Golden State; severance and transfer of other claims 
in the case along with the claims against Golden State; or 
transfer of the entire case, including the claims against 
Freeman, Sarkisian, Smith, and Wyatt, who all agreed to New 
Jersey forum-selection clauses.  To select among these 
options at Step Four, we are guided by considerations of 
efficiency, the non-contracting parties’ private interests, and 
Atlantic Marine’s directive that “courts should not . . . disrupt 
the parties’ settled expectations” embodied in forum-selection 
clauses except when other factors “overwhelmingly” weigh 
against enforcing the clauses, 134 S. Ct. at 583. 
The interests of efficiency clearly favor the severance 
and transfer of Howmedica’s claims against DePuy along 
with its claims against Golden State, because Howmedica 
charges these two corporate defendants with the same 
wrongdoing—aiding and abetting the breach of the duty of 
loyalty, tortious interference with contract and with 
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prospective economic advantage, unfair competition, and 
corporate raiding—and because “the same issues” should be 
litigated in the same forum, Sunbelt Corp., 5 F.3d at 33-34.14  
And to the extent such severance and transfer to California 
create a risk of duplicative litigation if the claims against the 
Sales Representatives are litigated in New Jersey, that risk 
can be reduced or eliminated with “procedural 
mechanisms . . . , such as common pre-trial procedures, video 
depositions, stipulations, etc.,” which can “echo those used by 
judges in cases managed pursuant to multidistrict litigation 
statutes,” and which can encompass joint oral argument and 
bellwether trials if necessary and appropriate.  Rolls Royce, 
775 F.3d at 681; see, e.g., Excentus Corp. v. Giant Eagle, 
Inc., 2014 WL 923520, at *10-11 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2014).15  
Although there may be some overlap in legal issues, we are 
confident that each court can become “familiar[] . . . with the 
applicable state law” (turning on the outcome of the courts’ 
                                              
14 For this reason, severance and transfer of only the 
claims against Golden State would be inefficient and 
inappropriate.  Also inappropriate is severance and transfer of 
the claims against Nordyke without transferring the claims 
against the other Sales Representatives, as Howmedica 
accuses Nordyke of the same misconduct as it does the other 
Sales Representatives: breach of contract, breach of the duty 
of loyalty, and unfair competition. 
15 See generally Fed. Judicial Ctr., Manual for 
Complex Litigation 227 (2004); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra 
D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 
Vand. L. Rev. 1053, 1134-35 (2013); Alexandra D. Lahav, 
Bellwether Trials, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 576, 581 (2008). 
32 
 
choice-of-law analyses and whether they choose to apply the 
choice-of-law provisions in the Sales Representatives’ 
employment agreements).  Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.  
Moreover, notwithstanding Howmedica’s purported concerns 
about “court congestion,” the caseloads in both courts are 
comparable.  Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.16   
“The enforceability of the judgment” and the “public 
policies of the fora,” Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, likewise support 
both courts’ jurisdiction, for “it is unlikely that there would be 
any significant difference in the difficulty of enforcing a 
judgment rendered by one federal forum or the other,” 
1 Moore, supra, § 7.81[3][b], and both California and New 
Jersey lack any public policy against enforcing  
forum-selection clauses, see Nedlloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior 
Court, 834 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); McMahon 
v. City of Newark, 951 A.2d 185, 187, 196-97 (N.J. 2008).17  
To the extent the “local interest in deciding local 
controversies at home” weighs against retaining in New 
Jersey any claims about the Sales Representatives, who all 
                                              
16 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, United States 
District Courts—National Judicial Caseload Profile 15, 66 
(2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_ 
tables/fcms_na_distprofile1231.2016.pdf. 
17 To be sure, California has a public policy against 
non-compete agreements.  See Advanced Bionics Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 59 P.3d 231, 236 (Cal. 2002).  But that 
public policy is distinct from any public policy regarding 
where a non-compete dispute should be litigated, which 
California does not have.  See id. at 237. 
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live in California and worked for Howmedica in California, 
Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879, California’s interest is offset by New 
Jersey’s countervailing interest in deciding claims concerning 
the employment agreements at issue, which Howmedica, a 
New Jersey corporation, prepared and executed in New 
Jersey, see generally Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 
F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1996). 
The non-contracting parties’ private interests also are 
not unduly prejudiced by severance and transfer of only the 
claims against the two corporate defendants.  Golden State is 
a California corporation, Howmedica’s claims against DePuy 
and Golden State pertain to these entities’ California 
operations, and, as a matter of law, the two corporate 
defendants will not be subject to issue preclusion.  See B & B 
Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1303; supra Part II.C.3.b.iii.  While 
retaining the claims against Nordyke in New Jersey cuts 
against Nordyke’s private interests given his relatively 
meager financial resources, see supra Part II.C.3.b.ii, 
Nordyke himself agreed to a forum-selection clause that 
designated a similarly inconvenient Michigan forum, and, 
particularly given that Nordyke is represented by the same 
counsel as the other Sales Representatives, the minimal 
additional burden to him of litigating in New Jersey does not 
“overwhelmingly” outweigh the interests in upholding the 
other parties’ “settled expectations,” Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 
583, and the efficiency of retaining Howmedica’s identical 
claims against all five Sales Representatives in one court, see 
supra note 12. 
III. Conclusion 
The correct outcome of our four-step transfer inquiry 
in this case is clear, as severance and transfer of only the 
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claims against DePuy and Golden State satisfies Atlantic 
Marine’s prescription that forum-selection clauses should be 
enforced “[i]n all but the most unusual cases,” Atl. Marine, 
134 S. Ct. at 583, accounts for private and public interests 
relevant to non-contracting parties, see Jumara, 55 F.3d at 
879-80, resolves the personal jurisdiction defect as to Golden 
State in New Jersey, see Howmedica I, 2015 WL 1780941, at 
*7-8 & n.11, and promotes efficient resolution of 
Howmedica’s claims without unduly prejudicing  
non-contracting parties’ private interests, see supra Part 
II.C.3.b.iv.  This outcome is therefore optimal for “the 
convenience of the parties and witnesses” and “in the interest 
of justice.”  28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).  Because the District Court 
clearly and indisputably erred in transferring this case in its 
entirety to the Northern District of California, we will issue a 
writ of mandamus vacating the transfer order and instructing 
the District Court on remand to sever Howmedica’s claims 
against DePuy and Golden State under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 21, to transfer those claims to the Northern District 
of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and to retain 
jurisdiction over Howmedica’s claims against the five Sales 
Representatives. 
